widely considered to be safe, and make out that two pigment suffers of the structured pay machinery fueled its spectacular growth. First, we show that near securities could only lease received high credit ranges if the rating agencies were extraordinarily confident about their ability to estimate the fundamental securities indifference insecuritys, and how potential defaults were to be correlated. Using the prototypical structured finance tribute the collateralized debt promise (CDO) as an example, we illustrate that issuing a capital structure amplifies errors in evaluating the risk of the fundamental securities. In particular, we show how depleted impreciseness in the parametric quantity estimates can lead to variation in the default risk of the structured finance securities which is sufficient, for example, to cause a security rated abdominal aortic aneurysm to default with reasonable likelihood. A second, equally overleap feature of the securitizati on process is that it substitutes risks that are largely diversifiable for risks that are highly systematic.

As a result, securities produced by structured finance activities have farther less chance of surviving a severe economic downturn than traditional corporate securities of equal 3 rating. Moreover, because the default risk of senior tranches is intemperate in systematically ill economic states, investors should demand far larger risk premia for prop structured claims than for holding comparably rated corporate bonds. We argue that two of these features of structured finance products the extrem e fragility of their ratings to modest impre! ciseness in evaluating underlying risks and their exposure to systematic risks go a long way in explaining the spectacular rise and go past of structured finance.If you want to get a plenteous essay, target it on our website:
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